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ABSTRACT
Discrete event sequences are ubiquitous, such as an ordered event
series of process interactions in Information and Communication
Technology systems. Recent years have witnessed increasing efforts
in detecting anomalies with discrete event sequences. However, it
still remains an extremely difficult task due to several intrinsic
challenges including data imbalance issue, discrete property of the
events, and sequential nature of the data. To address these chal-
lenges, in this paper, we propose OC4Seq, a multi-scale one-class
recurrent neural network for detecting anomalies in discrete event
sequences. Specifically, OC4Seq integrates the anomaly detection
objective with recurrent neural networks (RNNs) to embed the
discrete event sequences into latent spaces, where anomalies can
be easily detected. In addition, given that an anomalous sequence
could be caused by either individual events, subsequences of events,
or the whole sequence, we design a multi-scale RNN framework to
capture different levels of sequential patterns simultaneously. Ex-
perimental results on three benchmark datasets show thatOC4Seq
consistently outperforms various representative baselines by a large
margin. Moreover, through both quantitative and qualitative analy-
sis, the importance of capturing multi-scale sequential patterns for
event anomaly detection is verified.
KEYWORDS
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Log Messages
Log Key Sequence
Time Line
k1 k2 k3 k4 k5
2005-11-10-23.04.09.760063 R63-M0-N3-C:J14-U11 RAS KERNEL INFO iar 
00106298 dear 02f7a18c 
2005-11-10-23.12.32.269153 R63-M0-N5-C:J12-U01 RAS KERNEL INFO 488205 
floating point alignment exceptions 
2005-11-11-04.39.52.183132 R31-M0-N8-I:J18-U01 RAS KERNEL INFO ciod: 
generated 128 core files for program /bgl/apps/followup/SPaSM_static/
SPaSM_mpi.new_comp 
2005-11-11-18.58.22.474164 R23-M1-N0-C:J08-U11 RAS KERNEL INFO CE sym 
25, at 0x12127ee0, mask 0x10 
2005-11-14-18.25.23.269634 R46-M1-NE-C:J14-U11 RAS KERNEL FATAL rts: 
kernel terminated for reason 1004 
2005-11-15-21.12.12.119153 R63-M0-N2-C:J52-U01 RAS KERNEL INFO 489105 
floating point alignment exceptions 
k1:
k2:
k3:
k4:
k5:
k2:
k2
Figure 1: An illustrative example of BGL log messages and
the corresponding log key sequence. Each log message con-
tains a predefined log key that is underscored by red lines.
Jerusalem, Isreal. ACM, New York, NY, USA, 10 pages. https://doi.org/10.
1145/1122445.1122456
1 INTRODUCTION
Nowadays, Information and Communication Technology (ICT) has
permeated every aspect of our daily life and played a crucial role
in society than ever. While ICT systems have brought unprece-
dented convenience, when in abnormal states caused by malicious
attackers, they could also lead to ramifications including severe
loss of economy and social wellbeing [8, 17, 24, 25, 41]. Therefore,
it is vital to timely and accurately detect abnormal states of ICT
systems such that the loss can be mitigated. Fortunately, with the
ubiquitous sensors and networks, ICT systems have generated a
large amount of monitoring data [1, 15, 28, 49]. Such data contains
rich information and provides us with unprecedented opportunities
to understand complex states of ICT systems.
One type of the most important monitoring data is discrete event
sequence. A discrete event sequence is defined as an ordered series
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of events, where each event is a discrete symbol belonging to a
finite alphabet [9]. The discrete event sequences can be seen ev-
erywhere such as control commands of machine systems, logs of a
computer program, transactions of customer purchases, and DNA
sequences in genetics. Due to the rich information they provide,
they have been a valuable source for anomaly detection adopted
by both academic research and industry practice [6, 7, 9, 15, 16].
For example, system logs that record the detailed messages of run
time information by the modern computer systems are extensively
used for anomaly detection [15, 27, 33, 43]. Each log message can
be roughly considered as consisting of a predefined constant print
statement (also known as “log key” or “message type”) and a specific
parameter (also known as “variable”). When the log keys are ar-
ranged chronologically according to the recording time, they form a
discrete event sequence that can reflect the underlying system state.
Figure 1 shows an illustrative example of logs from a BlueGene/L
supercomputer system (BGL). In this example, six log messages are
generated by five corresponding predefined statements (log keys).
These log keys form a discrete event sequence. When the system in
an abnormal state, the resulted discrete event sequences will deviate
from the normal patterns. For instance, if “k2” always comes after
“k1” in a normal state, then the log key sequence (shown in Figure 1)
may indicate the abnormal state of the system because it shows
that “k2” comes directly after “k5”, which is unlikely to happen in
the normal state. In this work, we refer to discrete event sequences
generated by normal and abnormal system states as normal and
abnormal sequences, respectively.
Despite that detecting anomaly for discrete event sequences has
attracted much attention [9, 15, 18, 29, 31, 32], it still remains an
extremely difficult task due to several intrinsic challenges. The first
challenge is from the data imbalance issue that is commonly seen
in anomaly detection problems. As systems are in normal states in
most of the time, abnormal sequences are very rare. This makes the
data distributed very unequally in terms of normal and abnormal
states. Thus, binary classification models that have achieved great
success in the other problems become ineffective for anomaly de-
tection. Moreover, in reality, we often do not have prior knowledge
about the abnormal sequence that further exacerbates the difficulty.
The second obstacle comes from the discrete property of events.
Unlike continuous sequences where each event is real-valued and
have physical meanings, the discrete event sequence consists of dis-
crete symbols, making it hard to capture the relations of events over
time. Finally, the sequential nature of the data makes the problem
even more challenging. In order to determine whether a discrete
event sequence is abnormal or not, it is essential to consider each
individual event, subsequences of events, and the whole sequence
simultaneously. This requires dedicated efforts to designing models
that not only have strong capability to capture the sequential pat-
terns but also are flexible to handle sequential patterns at different
scales.
To address the aforementioned challenges, in this paper, we pro-
pose OC4Seq, a multi-scale one-class recurrent neural network
framework for event sequence anomaly detection. It is proposed
to directly integrate the anomaly detection objective with a spe-
cially designed deep sequence model that explicitly incorporates
sequential patterns at different scales. The main contributions of
this work are summarized as follows:
• We identify the importance of multi-scale sequential patterns
in anomaly detection for discrete event sequences empiri-
cally.
• We introduce a novel framework OC4Seq to explicitly cap-
ture multi-scale sequential patterns and directly optimize
the deep sequence models with a one-class classification
objective. OC4Seq can be trained in an end-to-end manner.
• We conduct extensive experiments on three datasets to con-
sistently demonstrate that OC4Seq outperforms the state-of-
the-art representative methods with a significant margin.
2 PROBLEM STATEMENT
Before we formally define the problem of anomaly detection for
discrete event sequences, we firstly introduce notations that will
be used throughout the rest of the paper. Lower-case letters such
as i and j are used to denote scalar variables and upper-case letters
such as N andM represent scalar constants. Moreover, we use bold
lower-case letters to denote vectors such as v and x and bold upper-
case for matrices such as W. In addition, the ith entry of a vector v
is denoted as v(i). Similarly, W(i, j) indicates the entry at ith row
and jth column of a matrix W. In the rest of the paper, event and
discrete event are used interchangeably. We use (· · · ) to represent
an event sequence and subscripts are used to index the events in
the sequence such as (x1,x2,x3).
Given an event set E that contains all possible discrete events, an
event sequence Si is defined as Si = (ei1, ei2, · · · , eiN i ), where eij ∈ E
and N i is the length of sequence Si . Each event eij is represented
by a categorical value, i.e., eij ∈ N+.
With the notations above, the anomaly detection for discrete
event sequence problem under the one-class setting is formally
defined as follows:
Given a set of sequences S = {S1, S2, · · · , SN }, where each se-
quence Si is normal, we aim to design a one-class classifier that is able
to identify whether a new sequence S is normal or not by capturing
the underlying multi-scale sequential patterns in S.
3 PRELIMINARIES: ONE-CLASS CLASSIFIER
In this section, we introduce preliminaries that lay a foundation
for our proposed framework. A one-class classifier is a specially
designed classifier that is trained with objects of a single class
and can predict whether an object belongs to this class or not in
the test stage. One of the most widely used one-class classifiers
is kernel-based such as One-Class Support Vector Machines (OC-
SVM) [36] and Support Vector Data Description (SVDD) [38]. Both
OC-SVM and SVDD are inspired by SVM that tries to maximize the
margin between two classes. Next, we use SVDD as an example to
illustrate traditional one-class classifiers. SVDD aims at finding a
spherically shaped boundary around the given data in the kernel
space. Concretely, let the center of the hypersphere be c and the
radius be R > 0. The SVDD objective is defined as follows:
min
R,c,ε
R2 +C
n∑
i=1
εi (1)
s .t .∥ϕ(xi − c)∥2 ≤ R2 + εi , εi ≥ 0, ∀i
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where xi is the feature vector of ith data and εi ≥ 0 is a slack
variable for xi that is introduced to allow the possibility of outliers
in the training set and hyperparameter C controls the trade-off
between errors εi and the volume of the sphere. The objective
defined in Equation 1 is in primary form and similar to SVM, it is
solved in the dual space by using Lagrange multipliers. For more
details of the optimization, please refer to the original paper [38].
Once the R and c are determined, the points that are outside the
sphere will be classified as other classes.
Recently, a deep neural network based one-class classifier called
Deep SVDD was introduced in [35]. Inspired by SVDD, it tries to
find a minimum hypersphere in the latent space. Unlike SVDD,
which relies on kernel functions for feature transformation, Deep
SVDD takes advantage of deep neural networks to learn data rep-
resentations. It employs a quadratic loss for penalizing the distance
of every data point representation to the center. The objective func-
tion has been proved with nice theoretical properties [35]. Once
the neural networks are trained and center fixed, outliers will be
detected similarly as SVDD.
4 THE PROPOSED FRAMEWORK
In this section, we introduce amulti-scale one-class recurrent neural
network framework for event sequence anomaly detection. An
overall of the proposed framework OC4Seq is shown in Figure 2.
It consists of two major components that focus on global and local
information in the sequences, respectively. The details of each
component are described in the next subsections.
4.1 Learning Embeddings for Events
The inputs of the framework are the sequences of events, where
each event et is a one-hot vector and e(j) = 1, e(i) = 0 ∀i , j if et is
the jth type event of the set E. In real-world scenarios, event space
could be very large, i.e., there are tens of thousands of event types.
This can lead et to be very high-dimensional and cause notorious
learning issues such as sparsity and curse of dimension. In addition,
one-hot vector representation makes an implicit assumption that
events are independent with each other, which does not hold inmost
cases. Therefore, we design an embedding layer to embed events
into a low-dimension space that can preserve relations between
events. To do so, we introduce an embedding matrix E ∈ Rde×|E | ,
where de is the dimension of the embedding space and |E | is the
number of event types in E. With this, the representation of et can
be obtained as follows:
xt = ET · et (2)
where xt ∈ Rde is the new low-dimensional dense representation
vector for et . After the embedding layer, the input sequences will
be passed into the other components that will be introduced next.
4.2 Anomaly Detection from Global
Perspective
To detect an anomalous sequence, it is important to learn an ef-
fective representation of the whole sequence in the latent space.
To this end, we propose to integrate the widely-used Gated Recur-
rent Neural Networks (GRU) [10] with one-class objective function.
Specifically, given a normal sequence, i.e., Si = (xi1, xi2, · · · , xiN i ),
the GRU learns a representation of the sequence in a recursive
manner. At the t th step, the GRU outputs a state vector hit , which is
a linear interpolation between previous state hit−1 and a candidate
state h˜it . Concretely:
hit = z
i
t ⊙ hit−1 + (1 − zit ) ⊙ h˜it (3)
where ⊙ is the element-wise multiplication. zt is the update gate
which is introduced to control how much current state should be
updated given the current information xit . zt is calculated as:
zit = σ (Wzxit + Uzhit−1) (4)
where Wz and Uz are the trainable parameters and σ (·) is a sigmoid
function which is defined as follows:
σ (x) = 11 + e−x (5)
Moreover, the candidate state h˜it introduced in Equation 3 is com-
puted as follows:
h˜it = д(Wxit + U(r it ⊙ hit−1)) (6)
where д(·) is the tanh function that is defined:
д(x) = e
x − e−x
ex + e−x (7)
W and U in Eq. (6) are trainable parameters. rt is the reset gate. It
is introduced to determine how much the candidate state should
incorporate previous state. The reset gate is calculated as:
r it = σ (Wr xit + Ur hit−1) (8)
As the state vector hN i at the final step summarizes all the
information in the previous steps, we regard it as the representation
of the whole sequence. Please note that the GRU component can
be replaced by any sequence learning models such as Long Short-
Term Memory (LSTM) [21]. In fact, we empirically found that the
two have similar performance. Due to its structural simplicity, we
choose GRU over LSTM. More details of the component analysis
can be found in Section 5.
Inspired by the intuition behind the Deep SVDD that all the
normal data should be lie within a hypersphere of minimum volume
in a latent space, we propose the following objective function to
guide the training process:
Lдlobal = minΘ
1
N
N∑
i=1
∥hN i − c∥2 + λ∥Θ∥2F (9)
Here, c is a predefined center in the latent space and n is the total
number of sequences in the training set. The first term in the objec-
tive function employs a quadratic loss for penalizing the distance of
every sequence representation to the center c and the second term
is a regularizer controlled by the hyperparameter λ. Therefore, this
objective will force the GRU model to map sequences to represen-
tation vectors that, on average, have the minimum distances to the
center c in the latent space.
Although the global GRU is effective to model the whole se-
quence, it might ignore vital information for event sequence anom-
aly detection because of the following reason: the abnormal prop-
erty of a sequence can be caused by only a small abnormal sub-
sequence or even a single abnormal event. However, when the
sequence is long, the abnormal information could be overwhelmed
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Figure 2: The overview of the proposed framework OC4Seq. It consists of two major components that learn the sequential
information from global and local perspectives, respectively.
by other normal subsequences during the representation learning
procedure. This could lead to a very high false negative rate.
4.3 Anomaly Detection from Local Perspective
In the previous subsection, we introduce to combine GRU and one-
class classification objective to embed the normal sequences in a
latent space where they lie within a small distance to a predefined
center. However, local information that is vital for anomaly detec-
tion could be overwhelmed during this process. Thus, we design a
subsequence learning component to detect the anomalies from the
local perspective.
For a given event sequence, we construct subsequences of a
fixed sizeM with a sliding window. Therefore, each subsequence
contains its unique local information, which plays an important
role in determining whether the whole sequence is abnormal or
not. To learn the representation of subsequence, we introduce the
local GRU component that will model the sequential dependen-
cies in every subsequence. To be concrete, given a subsequence
xit−M+1, x
i
t−M+2, · · · , xit of lengthM , the local GRU processes the
events sequentially and outputsM hidden states, the last of which
is used as the representation of the local subsequence:
hit = GRU(xit−M+1, xit−M+2, · · · , xit ) (10)
Thus, for all subsequences in a sequence, the GRU will obtain a
sequence of hidden representations that incorporate sequential
dependencies in every local region as follows:
hi1, h
i
2, · · · , hiN i−M = LocalGRU (xi1, xi2, · · · , xiN i ) (11)
where LocalGRU is the name for the second GRU model that pro-
cesses each subsequence. For a normal event sequence, it is intuitive
to assume that all of its subsequences are also normal. Thus, we
further assume that all the local subsequences should be within a
hypersphere in another latent space. To impose this assumption, we
design the following objective function to guide the local sequence
learning procedure:
Llocal = min
ΘL
1
N
N∑
i=1
N i−M∑
j=1
∥hN ij − c
L ∥2 + λ∥ΘL ∥2F (12)
Here, cL is a predefined center of another hypersphere in the latent
space and ΘL contains all the trainable parameters of LocalGRU.
Similarly, the first term penalizes the average distance between
all normal subsequences to the center cL and the second term is a
regularizer.
4.4 The Objective Function and Optimization
Procedure
In previous subsections, we have introduced components of OC4Seq
to detect an abnormal event sequence from both global and local
perspectives, respectively. In this subsection, we design an objective
function to combine them together. Specifically, given the global
and local loss function Lдlobal and Llocal , the overall objective
function of OC4Seq is defined as follows:
min
ΘL,Θ
L = Lдlobal + αLlocal (13)
where α is a hyper parameter that controls the contribution from
local information in the sequence. This objective enables us to train
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Table 1: The key statistics of RUBiS,HDFS, and BGL datasets.
Dataset # of normal # of abnormal # of log keys
RUBiS 11,677 1,000 24
HDFS 558,221 16,838 28
BGL 9,543 985 1,540
the framework in an end-to-end manner. The specific optimization
procedure is described next.
Optimization.We use stochastic gradient descent (SGD) and its
variants (e.g., Adam) to optimize the objective function defined in
Eq. (13). Following previous work [35], to accelerate the training
process, the predefined centers c is computed as follows: given
the untrained GRU, we firstly feed the sequences in the training
set into it and obtain the sequence representation vectors. Then,
we obtain an average vector by computing the mean value of all
representation vectors and use it as c. To obtain cL , a similar process
is applied with untrained LocalGRU. Once c and cL are obtained,
they remain as constant vectors in the optimization process. The
whole training process is done when the objective value converges.
5 EXPERIMENT
In this section, we evaluate the proposed framework OC4Seq on
three datasets.
5.1 Datasets
RUBiS [3]: This dataset is a weblog dataset and was generated by
an auction site prototype modeled after eBay.com [3]. Specifically,
each log message contains information related to a user web be-
havior including user_id, date, request_info, etc. Following previous
work [46, 48], we first parse each log message into a structured
representation, which consists of a log key and a variable among
others. Next, the log keys of the same user are collected following
the time order that forms an event sequence. Thus, each log key
sequence represents a user behavior session on a web server.
Each abnormal sequence corresponds to an attack case. In total,
there are 11, 677 normal sequences and 1, 000 abnormal sequences.
Hadoop Distributed File System (HDFS) [43]: This dataset was
generated by a Hadoop-based map-reduce cloud environment using
benchmarkworkloads. It contains 11,175,629 logmessages, of which
2.9% are labeled as anomalies by Hadoop experts. Each log message
involves a block ID, a timestamp, and state information. Tomake the
comparison fair, we used the publicly available dataset1 processed
by [15]. As described in [15], the log messages are firstly parsed into
structured text so that a log key is extracted from each log message.
In addition, the log keys are sliced into sequences according to
the associated block IDs. As a result, there are 558, 221 normal
sequences and 16, 838 abnormal sequences.
BlueGene/L (BGL) [33]: This dataset contains 4, 747, 936 log mes-
sages generated by a BlueGene/L supercomputer systemwith 131, 072
processors and 32, 768GBmemory at Lawrence Livermore National
Labs. Each log message contains system information such as type,
timestamp, nodes, content, etc. The log messages can be categorized
1https://www.cs.utah.edu/ mind/papers/deeplog_misc.html
into two types, i.e., non-alert and alert. The non-alert messages are
labeled as normal and alert messages are labeled as abnormal. The
log messages are firstly parsed by Drain [19] whose implementa-
tion2 is open sourced by [50]. Following previous work [30], the log
keys are sliced using time sliding windows. A sequence is labeled
as abnormal if it contains at least one abnormal message. After
processing, there are 9, 543 normal sequences and 985 abnormal
sequences.
The statistics of the three datasets are summarized in Table 1. As
stated in Section 2, this work focuses on the one-class/unsupervised
setting, where the training dataset does not contain any abnormal
sequence. Therefore, each dataset is split into training, validation,
and test sets by the following process. Firstly, we randomly sample
the training data from the normal sequence set. Then, we sepa-
rately split the remaining normal sequences and all the abnormal
sequences into validation and test sets with the ratio 3/7 (valida-
tion/test). At last, we combine the two validation/test sets into
one.
5.2 Baselines
We compare OC4Seq with the following five anomaly detection
baselines:
Principle Component Analysis (PCA) [42]. PCA is a classic
unsupervised method that has been extensively used for a variety of
problems. More recently, it becomes a popular method for anomaly
detection [43]. Specifically, it firstly constructs a count matrix M,
where each row represents a sequence, each column denotes a
log key, and each entry M(i, j) indicates the count of jth log key
in the ith sequence. Next, PCA learns a transformed coordinate
system, where the projection lengths of normal sequences are small
while these of abnormal sequences are large. Although it has been
shown that PCA can be effective in detecting anomalies especially in
reducing false positives [15], it ignores the sequential information,
which could play an important role in event sequence anomaly
detection. We use the open-sourced implementation3 [20].
Invariant Mining (IM) [27]. IM is another popular unsuper-
vised anomaly detection method. It is designed to automatically
mine invariants in logs and assumes that the discovered invari-
ants can capture the inherent linear characteristics of log flows.
Similar to PCA, it firstly constructs a count matrix M. Next, IM
learns sparse, integer-valued invariants with physical meanings
from M. Finally, with the learned invariants, IM makes an invariant
hypothesis. And the sequences that do not satisfy the hypothesis
are detected as anomalies. As IM also relies on theM , it has similar
drawbacks to PCA. The IM used in this work was implemented
by [20].
One-Class SVM (OC-SVM) [36]. OC-SVM is a very effective
one-class classifier that has been extensively used for anomaly
detection [2, 26, 40].
Specifically, it learns a kernel that maps the normal data into
a latent space, where all the normal sequence clusters in a small
region. Thus, a sequence that does not belong to the cluster is
regarded as abnormal. To apply OC-SVM, we first need to extract
features from each sequence. In this work, we tried two models to
2https://github.com/logpai/logparser
3https://github.com/logpai/loglizer
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Table 2: The prediction performance comparison on RUBiS, HDFS, and BGL dataset.
Method HDFS RUBiS BGL
F-1 score Precision Recall F-1 score Precision Recall F-1 score Precision Recall
OC-SVM 0.509 0.622 0.431 0.351 0.220 0.869 0.336 0.215 0.764
PCA 0.634 0.968 0.471 0.784 0.862 0.718 0.423 0.269 0.993
Invariant Mining 0.943 0.893 1.000 0.912 0.841 0.996 0.428 0.273 1.000
DeepLog 0.941 0.952 0.930 0.935 0.885 0.992 0.326 0.196 0.980
DeepSVDD 0.872 0.964 0.796 0.970 0.974 0.966 0.410 0.298 0.659
OC4Seq 0.976 0.955 0.998 0.985 0.987 0.983 0.747 0.704 0.795
extract features: sequence auto-encoder [13] and bag-of-words [47].
As we empirically found the latter often has better performance, we
choose bag-of-words as the feature extractor. The OC-SVM used in
this work was implemented with the scikit-learn package4.
DeepLog [15]. DeepLog is a state-of-the-art log anomaly detec-
tion method. This method is based on an LSTM model, which tries
to capture the sequential dependencies in sequences. Specifically,
by training with normal sequences, it learns to predict the next
token given the previously seen tokens in a sequence. During the
test stage, for each time step in a sequence, DeepLog will output a
probability distribution over all the log keys. If any of the actual
tokens are not in the top k candidates, it will regard the sequence
as abnormal. Compared to other baselines, this method can uti-
lize sequential information and has demonstrated state-of-the-art
performance in previous work.
DeepSVDD [35]. DeepSVDD is a general one-class classifier
that builds on deep neural networks. It simultaneously learns a
representation vector for each data and optimizes the anomaly
detection objective directly. To make the comparison fair, we use
the same RNN models in OC4Seq as its representation learning
component. The implementation can be found at github5.
5.3 Experimental Settings
Model Selection: For all the methods with hyper-parameters, we
use the validation set to select the best value and report the perfor-
mance on the test set. For DeepLog, we follow the original paper’s
suggestion [15]. Specifically, both the h and д are selected from
{8, 9, 10}, which denotes window size and candidate number, re-
spectively. The number of layers is set to be 2 and the number
of LSTM hidden units is 64. For OC4Seq, we use the same hyper-
parameters as DeepLog and select α that controls the contribution
of local subsequence from {0.01, 0.1, 1, 10}.
Implementation Details:We implemented OC4Seq with Pytorch
1.56. The model is trained using Adam [23] optimizer with the
learning rate to be 0.01. The mini-batch size is chosen to be 64 and
the model is trained for 100 epochs on a single NVIDIA GEFORCE
RTX 2080 card.
EvaluationMetrics: To measure the model performance on anom-
aly detection, we choose the widely-used Precision, Recall, and F1
4https://scikit-learn.org/
5https://github.com/lukasruff/Deep-SVDD
6https://pytorch.org/
score as the evaluation metrics. They are defined as follows:
Precision =
TP
TP + FP
Recall =
TP
TP + FN
(14)
F1 = 2 ∗ Precision ∗ Recall
Precision + Recall
where TP (True Positives) denotes the number of true abnormal
sequences that are detected by the model, FP (False Positives) mea-
sures the number of normal sequences that are regarded as anom-
alies, and FN (False Negatives) denotes the number of abnormal
sequences the model fails to report. Thus, based on these definitions,
there is a well-known trade-off between precision and recall. On
the other hand, the F1 score considers the balance of the two and is
often considered as a more comprehensive evaluation metric.
5.4 Performance Comparison
The results of all methods on three datasets are shown in Table 2.
From the table, we can make the following observations: 1) On
most datasets, OC-SVM has the worst performance. We argue that
this is because OC-SVM is highly dependent on feature qualities.
Unlike dense data where OC-SVM generally performs very well,
it is very hard to extract meaningful features from discrete event
sequences. 2) IM and DeepLog outperform PCA significantly in
most of the evaluation metrics. This is expected as both IM and
DeepLog are designed specifically for anomaly detection for log
data. 3) IM and DeepLog generally have comparable results in terms
of F-1 score. It is interesting to observe that IM always achieves very
impressive Recall while DeepLog is better in Precision. We argue
that this difference could be caused by the fact that DeepLog fo-
cuses much on the local subsequence information while IM always
concentrates on global sequence information. 4) The performance
of DeepSVDD varies significantly in different datasets. This is be-
cause it only focuses on global information in the sequences. Thus,
it can do very well with the datasets where local information is
not important and becomes much worse otherwise. 5) On all the
datasets, the proposed framework OC4Seq has achieved the best
F-1 scores. In addition, when comparing to the second-best method,
the performance gain brought by OC4Seq is significant. In terms
of Precision, OC4Seq still achieved the highest value in most cases.
For Recall, OC4Seq was only slightly outperformed by IM which
has much lower precision scores. 6) All of the methods performed
much worse on BGL datasets than the other two datasets. This
is because BGL involves much more log keys that can make the
task extremely difficult. Moreover, it is interesting to note that the
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Figure 3: Validation Precision-Recall curves on HDFS dataset.
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Figure 4: The local and global anomaly scores of HDFS log key sequences.
DeepLog method becomes especially ineffective as it heavily relies
on the next key prediction which is very difficult when log keys
space becomes large. In this challenging case, the improvement
from OC4seq over other baselines becomes even more remarkable.
As a summary, from the experimental results on three datasets,
our proposed framework OC4Seq demonstrates its superior perfor-
mance over the representative baselines. We argue this is because
OC4Seq can capture sequential information from both local subse-
quence and whole sequence and it directly optimizes the anomaly
detection objective. Next, we design further experiments to gain
deeper understandings of OC4Seq.
5.5 Parameter Analysis
In this subsection, we analyze key hyper-parameters and compo-
nents of OC4Seq. We only report the performance on the HDFS
validation dataset as we have similar observations on the others.
Moreover, the performance is evaluated by the Precision-Recall
curve as it eliminates the need to choose a specific anomaly thresh-
old and very suitable for datasets with imbalanced label distribution.
We also report the area under the Precision-Recall curve (average
precision) where the higher the value, the better the performance.
We firstly vary the value of α from {0, 0.01, 0.1, 1, 10}, which
controls the contribution from local subsequence information. The
results are shown in Figure 3a. From the figure, we can see that
with the increase of α , the performance firstly increases and then
decreases. The initial increase demonstrates the importance to in-
corporate local subsequence information while the latter decrease
suggests that the global sequential information is also very essential
and should not be overwhelmed by local information.
Next, we vary the number of RNN layers from {1, 2, 3, 4}, and
the results are shown in Figure 3b. These results suggest that more
layers does not necessarily lead to better performance as it may
cause other issues such as overfitting. Thus, it is important to select
a proper value through the validation process.
Finally, to investigate how different types of RNN cell affect
anomaly detection performance, we experienced on popular cells,
i.e., RNN (Vanilla), GRU, LSTM. The results are shown in Figure 3c.
From the figure, it is easily seen that the LSTM and GRU cells have
very similar performance while vanilla RNN achieves much worse
results. These results are consistent with previous work [12]. Due
to its simpler structure, we choose GRU in OC4Seq.
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5.6 Case Study
In this subsection, to further understand how the local and global
information contribute to anomaly detection, we conduct case stud-
ies involving two pairs of representative log key sequences from
HDFS dataset. Specifically, for a sequence, we use the trained model
to calculate the anomaly scores of each subsequence and the whole
sequence. The higher the anomaly score is, the more likely the
sequence is abnormal. The results are shown in Figure 4.
In Figure 4a, we show the first pair of normal and abnormal
sequences. The left panel uses dot lines to demonstrate the anoma-
lous scores for local subsequences. Each dot denotes one anomalous
score (y-axis) of xth subsequence (x-axis). The right panel uses the
bar to show the anomalous score for the whole sequence (global
information). From the figure, we observe that the two sequences
have comparable anomalous scores for the whole sequence. Thus,
it is very difficult to detect the abnormal one purely from the global
perspective. However, from the local perspective, we can see that
the 10th subsequence of the abnormal sequence has a very high
anomalous score while the anomalous scores of the subsequence of
the normal sequence are all very low. Therefore, in this case, the lo-
cal information plays a very important role in detecting anomalies.
In Figure 4b, the anomalous scores of the second pair of se-
quences are shown. Unlike the previous case, the second pair of
sequences has very similar anomalous scores for local subsequences.
This makes it hard to detect anomaly from the local perspective.
However, the abnormal sequence has a significantly higher anoma-
lous score from the global perspective than the normal one. There-
fore, the global information contributes a lot to detecting the anom-
aly in this case. From the two cases, we further illustrate the impor-
tance of combining both local and global information in a sequence
for anomaly detection.
5.7 Visualization of Normal and Abnormal
Sequences
To gain insights of the one-class classifier objective function, we
project the global representations of both normal and abnormal
sequences in the HDFS validation set to a two-dimensional space
by Local Linear Embedding techniques [14]. The visualization of
the two-dimensional space is shown in Figure 5. We observe that
the normal sequences generally cluster together and lie in a very
small region. On the other hand, the abnormal sequences spread
all over the place. Therefore, the visualization clearly shows that
by directly minimizing the anomalous score, which measures the
distance between a normal data point and a center point, the one-
class classifier objective function is very effective to guide the model
to separate the abnormal and normal sequences in the latent space.
6 RELATEDWORK
In this section, we briefly review the related work on discrete event
sequence anomaly detection and one-class classifier.
AnomalyDetection forDiscrete Event Sequence:There have
been many research papers studying event sequence anomaly detec-
tion. One typical traditional anomaly detection method is similarity-
based approach [4, 6, 7], where the similarity between a test se-
quence and training sequences is calculated and the anomalies are
detected based on similarity scores. One major issue with similarity
0.15 0.10 0.05 0.00 0.05 0.10
0.05
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Figure 5: The visualization of the HDFS dataset. Abnormal
and normal data are denoted by red and blue dots, respec-
tively. It can be seen that normal sequences cluster in a
small region while abnormal sequences spread over the la-
tent space.
based methods is that there is a lack of intrinsic measurement of
similarity between discrete event sequences and the effectiveness of
the model can be largely affected by the choice of the similarity mea-
surement. Other popular traditional methods include Markovian
techniques and Hidden Markov Model based ones [11, 37, 44, 45].
However, the capacities of these models are too small to capture the
complex long-term dependencies in the sequences. More recently,
neural network based methods [5, 15, 22, 39] have been proposed
for anomaly detection and achieved great success due to its strong
representation learning ability and large modeling capacities.
One-Class Classifier forAnomalyDetection:One-class clas-
sifiers focus on learning the properties of objects from a single class
and are trained to detect objects that are from any other classes.
Therefore, they are very suitable for anomaly detection tasks and
have gained great attention [34, 40]. The two most successful one-
class classifiers are OC-SVM and SVDD [36, 38] that are based
on traditional kernel tricks. Only recently, deep neural network
based one-class classifier is proposed by Ruff et al. [35]. Inspired by
SVDD [38], the authors designed a novel one-class classification
objective that has very nice theoretical properties and can effec-
tively train CNNs for image anomaly detection tasks. Considering
the success of one-class classifiers, we also build our framework
upon similar objective functions. However, unlike previous works
that mainly focus on dense data such as images, we conduct pio-
neering research of building one-class recurrent neural networks
for discrete event sequences, which have very unique challenges
comparing to the dense data.
7 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose OC4Seq, an end-to-end one-class recur-
rent neural network for discrete event sequence detection. OC4Seq
can deal with multi-scale sequential dependencies and detect anom-
alies from both local and global perspectives. Specifically, OC4Seq
incorporates an effective anomaly detection objective that can guide
the learning process of sequence models. The trained multi-scale se-
quence model in OC4Seq explicitly maps the local subsequence and
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whole sequence into different latent spaces, where the normal data
points are enclosed by hyperspheres with minimum volume. The
proposed OC4Seq has consistently shown superior performance
than representative baselines in extensive experiments on three
benchmark datasets. In addition, through parameter analysis and
case studies, the importance of capturing multi-scale sequential de-
pendencies for discrete event sequence anomaly detection has been
well demonstrated. Moreover, the visualization of the sequence
representations qualitatively suggests the effectiveness of anomaly
detection objectives.
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